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6Friendship	and	Love	of	Honor
The	Education	of	Henry	V
Bernard	J.	Dobski
Power	is	a	poison	well	known	for	thousands	of	years.	If	only	no	one	were	ever	to	acquire	material	power	over	others!
But	to	the	human	being	who	has	faith	in	some	force	that	holds	dominion	over	all	of	us,	and	who	is	therefore	conscious	of
his	own	limitations,	power	is	not	necessarily	fatal.
—Aleksandr	Solzhenitsyn,	“The	Bluecaps”1
In	The	Case	for	Greatness:	Honorable	Ambition	and	Its	Critics,	Robert	Faulkner	argues	that
statesmen	like	George	Washington,	Abraham	Lincoln,	and	Winston	Churchill	stand	apart	from
the	tyrants	and	demagogues	of	political	 life	because	they	managed	the	unique	combination	of
goodness	and	greatness,	that	is	of	“sober	respect	for	the	law	with	honorable	superiority.”2	As
such,	they	were	able	to	employ	their	considerable	political	talents	and	energies	in	the	effort	to
create	or	restore	lawful	political	orders	whose	enduring	power	reflected	their	own	brilliance.
But	 such	 men	 also	 inherited	 traditions	 of	 republicanism,	 liberal	 constitutionalism	 and	 a
Christian	ethos	that	upheld	the	rights	and	dignity	of	the	individual;	they	could	be	conscious	of
their	own	limitations	because	they	could	acknowledge	the	political	and	religious	traditions	that
existed	 independent	 of	 their	 making	 and	 outside	 of	 their	 control.	 These	 traditions	 were	 the
preconditions	of	their	greatness,	providing	them	with	a	moral	horizon	that	could	ennoble	their
already	considerable	virtues.	But	what	of	the	founder	or	restorer	of	a	great	political	order	who
appears	 to	 enjoy	 no	 such	 advantages?	 Can	 one	 achieve	 that	 combination	 of	 goodness	 and
greatness	absent	such	conditions?
In	Shakespeare’s	presentation	of	King	Henry	V	one	finds	just	such	a	“restorer”—a	monarch
who,	through	almost	entirely	his	own	efforts,	manages	to	invest	his	throne	and	his	country	with
a	sense	of	national	unity	and	greatness.	In	bringing	together	English,	Welsh,	Irish	and	Scottish
soldiers	in	his	conquest	of	France,	Henry	V	manages	to	unite	them	as	one	people,	giving	them	a
sense	of	national	pride	that	extends	through	the	ages.3	Through	his	military	genius	at	Agincourt,
Henry	V	not	only	brought	order	 to	 the	British	people	but	restored	legitimacy	to	a	crown	that
had	 been	 undermined	 by	 his	 father’s	 usurpation	 of	 Richard	 II.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 Henry	 V’s
conquests	dissolved	after	his	untimely	death,	and	that	his	passing	made	possible	the	War	of	the
Roses	 whose	 final	 issue	 was	 the	 abominable	 Richard	 III.	 But	 one	 must	 not	 forget	 that	 the
tarnished	 crown	whose	 luster	Henry	V	 restored	 so	 brilliantly	was	 able	 to	 protect	 his	 infant
son’s	 claim	 to	 the	 throne	 until	 he,	 coming	 into	 his	 majority,	 repeatedly	 demonstrated	 his
unworthiness	 for	 the	“golden	 rigol.”	Despite	 these	 failings,	Henry	V’s	 seemingly	miraculous
victory	over	the	French,	like	those	of	Edward	III	and	the	Black	Prince	before	him,	remained	a
dazzling	 star	 by	 which	 the	 British	 people	 and	 their	 sovereigns	 could	 navigate	 national
greatness.
We	can	best	appreciate	how	Shakespeare’s	Henry	V	was	able	to	restore	political	authority
to	the	crown	of	England	by	understanding	Henry’s	own	political	education,	one	connected	(but
not	 reducible)	 to	 his	 friendly	 association	 with	 the	 monstrously	 lovable	 Sir	 John	 Falstaff.
Indeed,	 as	 anyone	 familiar	with	 the	Henriad	 knows,	 one	 cannot	 hope	 to	 do	 justice	 to	Hal’s
famous	 political	 career	 without	 an	 appreciation	 of	 his	 no	 less	 famous	 friendship	 with	 that
“fallen	 knight”	 whose	 blistering	 wit	 and	 unfaltering	 devotion	 to	 the	 young	 Prince	 not	 only
match	 his	 prodigious	 appetites	 for	 sack	 and	 sex,	 but	 incline	 so	 many	 to	 forgive	 and	 even
celebrate	his	(not	always	minor)	outrages	against	human	decency.	Shakespeare’s	artistry	makes
it	nearly	irresistible	for	his	audience	to	link	the	form	of	love	that	is	friendship	to	the	seemingly
boundless	pursuit	of	honor	that	defines	the	future	King	of	England.	A	proper	understanding	of
Hal’s	 view	 of	 honor	 is	 thus	 prepared	 by	 understanding	 the	 impact	 of	 one	 of	 the	 most
memorable	and	most	celebrated	friendships	in	all	of	Shakespeare’s	work.	Such	at	any	rate	are
the	views	advanced	by	some	of	the	most	current	scholarly	treatments	of	Hal	and	Falstaff.4
The	“Problem”	of	Hal’s	Political	Education
Contrary	to	the	these	views,	I	argue	that	Hal	parts	ways	with	his	porcine	companion	early	in
the	 Henriad	 and	 that	 he	 does	 so	 precisely	 over	 the	 proper	 understanding	 of	 honor,	 of	 the
origins,	 character	 and	 value	 of	 a	 lawful	 order,	 sacrifice	 in	 the	 service	 of	 which	 yields	 the
praise	 of	 men	 and	 the	 glory	 of	 nations.	 For	 Hal,	 contrary	 to	 Falstaff’s	 famous	 battlefield
“catechism”	at	Shrewsbury	(1H4	V.i.127–40)5	honor	 is	not	merely	air.	Hal’s	no	 less	 famous
remarks	 before	 the	 battle	 at	 Agincourt—“If	 it	 be	 a	 sin	 to	 covet	 honor	 then	 I	 am	 the	 most
offending	soul	alive”	(H5	IV.iii.28-9)—could	not	have	been	learned	at	the	feet	of	his	so-called
Socratic	master.6	Indeed,	unlike	the	sensualist	Falstaff,	Hal	repeatedly	demonstrates	a	concern
for	more	 than	material	 pleasure,	 a	 concern	 that	 leads	him	 to	pursue	greatness	 at	 the	peak	of
politics.	 For	 Hal,	 political	 life	 at	 its	 best	 can	 ennoble	 men,	 this	 despite—or	 perhaps	 even
because	of—the	fact	that	he	never	expresses	a	belief	in	an	immortal	soul	or	a	judgmental	God
who	 rules	 the	 afterlife.	Hal’s	 political	 conviction	 centers	 on	 the	 earthly	 dignity	 available	 to
human	beings	through	a	properly	ordered	politics.	While	the	experience	with	Falstaff	certainly
sharpened	his	wits	and	 refined	his	 rhetorical	 skills,	Hal’s	genuine	 insights	 into	 those	hidden
springs	 that	 generate	men’s	 devotion	 to	 lawful	 political	 orders	 and	 to	 the	kings	who	uphold
them—that	is,	his	true	education	in	politics—derive	from	his	own	reflections	on	the	nature	of
political	life.
Much	of	the	scholarly	debate	over	the	extent	to	which	Hal	is	the	creature	of	Falstaff	takes
the	form	of	whether	Shakespeare	intends	us	to	understand	Hal	as	the	ideal	of	the	Christian	King
or	the	avatar	of	Machiavellian	cunning.7	Suffice	it	to	say	that	there	is	ample	evidence	on	both
sides	 to	 suggest	 that	Hal	 can	be	 simply	neither	one	nor	 the	other,	but	 in	 some	way	effects	 a
combination	of	the	two.	Hal’s	deviations	from	traditional	morality	are	sufficiently	numerous	to
render	problematic	his	candidacy	for	“mirror	of	Christian	kings”	(H5	II.Chorus.6)—whether	it
be	his	venial	sins,	like	his	toleration	of	theft	and	his	utilitarian	approach	to	friendship,	or	his
larger	perversions,	like	a	war	with	Catholic	France	whose	justice	is	questionable	at	best	and	a
public	rhetoric	that	would	appear	to	corrupt	his	countrymen.
And	yet	Henry	does	not	simply	disregard	political	and	ethical	limits.	He	is	the	only	king	in
this	tetralogy	who	we	see	convene	Parliament,	that	institutional	symbol	of	British	constitutional
order	 (2H4	 V.ii.134,	V.v.103).8	While	 on	 campaign	 in	 France,	Henry	 urges	 “mercy”	 for	 the
inhabitants	 of	 Harfleur	 (H5	 III.iv.54),	 commands	 his	 troops	 not	 to	 steal	 from	 the	 villages,
indeed,	not	even	to	abuse	“the	French	…	in	disdainful	language”	(H5	III.	vi.108–10,	emphasis
added);	 and	he	 enforces	 the	death	penalty	 for	 those	 caught	 stealing	 (Bardolph	 and	Nym,	H5
III.vi.106,	IV.v.72).	In	his	last	appearance	in	Shakespeare’s	drama	he	informs	us	that	while	he
and	 his	 future	Queen	 are	 “the	maker	 of	manners”	 they	may	 not	 ignore	 all	 customs	 (just	 the
“nice”	ones;	H5	 V.ii.268–69).	 Lest	we	 conclude	 that	Henry	 simply	wants	 to	 appear	 to	 take
political	 and	 ethical	 limits	 seriously,	we	 should	 note	 that	 his	 eulogy	over	Hotspur	 (V.iv.86–
100),	the	bestowal	of	his	favors	on	Hotspur’s	corpse	(V.iv.95),	his	mourning	over	the	death	of
his	father	(2H4	II.ii.38–65,	IV.v.82–87;	cf.	IV.v.36–39),	and	his	prayer	on	the	eve	of	Agin-court
(H5	 IV.i.286–303),	 all	 occur	 without	 the	 benefit	 of	 a	 public	 audience;	 the	 Machiavellian
concern	 to	appear	 just	does	not	 apply	here.	Hal	 seems	 to	be	both	Machiavellian	Prince	and
Christian	King	without	being	fully	one	or	the	other.
To	understand	how	Hal	might	combine	a	Machiavellian	prudence	with	what	one	might	call
a	Christian	respect	for	the	limits	governing	such	prudence,	I	turn	to	Henry	IV,	Part	1	and	to	a
close	study	of	Act	2,	scene	4	and	specifically	the	“prank”	played	by	Hal	on	Francis	the	wine-
drawer.	 This	 much	 neglected	 passage	 represents	 a	 decisive	 moment	 in	 Hal’s	 political
education,	one	whose	proper	recovery	opens	new	interpretive	vistas	for	the	remainder	of	the
Henriad.	A	close	reading	of	this	scene	shows	why	Hal	does	not	accept	the	Falstaffian	critique
of	 honor.	 It	 helps	 us	 understand	why	 he	 does	 not	 think	men’s	 dedication	 to	 the	 law	merely
reflects	concessions	to	force,	fraud,	or	the	deep-seated	irrationality	of	people.	On	the	contrary,
the	episode	in	question	indicates	that	men’s	dedication	to	lawful	orders	finds	its	support	in	an
order	 (be	 it	 natural	 or	 divine)	 that	 exists	 independent	of	 human	agency.	As	 such,	 it	 not	 only
shows	 us	 why	 Hal	 might	 banish	 Falstaff	 as	 he	 does	 but	 how	 he	 might	 understand	 the	 link
between	the	cosmic	order,	which	is	not	of	our	making,	and	the	lawful	order,	which	is	at	least
partly	of	our	making,	to	provide	a	path	to	his	own	pursuit	of	glory.	Hal	learns	that	the	kind	of
honors	 that	he	 seeks	 cannot	be	won	without	 attending	 to	 and	 thus	genuinely	 respecting	 those
limits	 on	 the	 pursuit	 of	 self-interest	 that	 are	 external	 to	 human	 agency	 and	 which,	 when
observed,	can	lend	political	life	a	dignity	it	might	otherwise	lack.	These	insights	prove	crucial
to	understanding	both	Hal’s	dedication	to	active	political	life	and	that	St.	Crispin’s	Day	speech
which	so	glitteringly	crowns	it.
Act	II	in	Henry	IV,	Part	1:	Lawful	Orders
While	we	hear	of	Hal	in	Richard	II	(V.iii.1–22)	we	do	not	see	him	until	Henry	IV,	Part	1.	But
when	we	finally	do	meet	him—in	fact	the	first	two	times	we	encounter	Hal—we	see	him	in	the
company	 of	 Falstaff	 with	 their	 comedic	 antics	 on	 full	 display	 (1H4	 I.i,	 II.ii).	 Such	 is
Shakespeare’s	art	 that	 the	 impression	cast	by	 these	 initial	pairings	 is	virtually	 impossible	 to
undo;	 the	 laughably	 outrageous	 Falstaff	 and	 the	 scandalously	 ambitious	 Hal	 seem	 forever
linked	in	the	minds	of	his	audience	as	Shakespeare’s	representation	of	friendship.	It	is	in	Act	2,
scene	 4,	 however,	 where	 Shakespeare	 first	 addresses	 explicitly	 and	 at	 length	 the	 political
consequences	of	their	relationship.	It	is	also	the	scene	where	he	sketches	the	grounds	of	their
break.	To	 appreciate	 the	 significance	of	 this	 passage,	we	must	 situate	 it	within	 the	Act	 as	 a
whole.	And	a	moment’s	reflection	on	Act	2	of	Henry	IV,	Part	1	will	show	that	its	theme	is	the
status	 of	 the	 ties	 that	 constitute	 personal	 and	 civic	 duties	 in	 an	 England	 where	 respect	 for
ceremony	and	long-standing	custom	has	been	overturned.
From	the	Carriers	despairing	of	the	death	of	the	old	ostler	and	the	apparent	inadequacies	of
his	 replacement	 that	open	 the	Act	 (II.i.1–34)	 to	 the	mock	 trial	between	Hal	and	Falstaff	 that
closes	 it	 (II.iv.363–465),	Act	 2	 of	Henry	 IV,	 Part	 1	 reveals	 the	 strains	 newly	 placed	 upon
men’s	attachment	to	lawfulness	by	Bolingbroke’s	usurpation	of	Richard	II.	But	more	than	just
legal	 authority	 was	 brought	 into	 question	 by	 the	 deposition	 of	 a	 divine	 right	 king.	 The
discrediting	of	an	order	that	enjoyed	the	sanction	of	both	God’s	authority	and	human	practice
also	 makes	 vulnerable	 long-standing	 alliances	 (II.iii.1–33),	 marital	 duties	 (II.iii.36–115),
contractual	 obligations	 (II.iv.33–91),	 filial	 piety	 (II.iv.363–465)	 and	 even	 the	 rights	 of
friendship	 (II.ii.1–45;	 II.iv.242–71).	 If	 there	 is	 any	 truth	 to	 the	 old	 adage	 that	 “the	 owl	 of
Minerva	flies	at	dusk,”	then	we	may	plausibly	conclude	that	a	study	of	Act	2,	with	its	focus	on
England’s	 diseased	 state,	will	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 those	 pillars	 required	 to	 uphold	 a
healthy	political	order.	As	the	opening	scene	indicates,	England,	with	her	old	caretaker	gone
and	her	new	one	seemingly	unable	to	learn	the	ropes	of	his	position	(II.i.1–31),	has	fallen	ill.	It
is	 thus	 possible	 for	 one	 to	 wonder	 now	 in	 a	 way	 that	might	 be	more	 difficult	 under	 better
circumstances	if	a	new	“ostler”	(II.ii.40)	can	be	found	capable	of	restoring	England	to	political
health.
Shakespeare	 invites	 us	 to	 place	 our	 hopes	 for	 just	 such	 an	 “ostler”	 in	 the	 figure	 of	Hal
himself.	For	while	the	theme	of	this	Act	is	the	degraded	state	of	England’s	political	health,	its
dramatic	 sequencing	 reveals	 a	 counter-movement,	 one	 whose	 denouement	 suggests	 that	 a
lawful	order	is	(or	will	be)	restored	and	that	 it	will	find	this	restoration	in	and	through	Hal.
Following	the	Carriers	bemoaning	England’s	diseased	state,	the	Act	turns,	first,	to	the	plotting
and,	then,	to	the	execution	of	a	robbery	(and	counter-theft)	by	the	prince	and	his	companions.
Scene	3	gives	us	the	greatest	political	evil,	the	internal	workings	of	the	conspiracy	against	the
crown.	And	yet	it	 is	an	evil	whose	prospects	are	already	beginning	to	unravel;	we	learn	that
Hotspur’s	 allies	 are	 beginning	 to	 drop	 off	 from	his	 cause.	The	 prospects	 of	 political	 health
continue	to	improve	as	we	turn	to	the	last	scene	of	the	Act.	Here	we	see	that	scofflaw	Falstaff
unmasked	as	 a	 liar	 and	a	 cheat,	we	witness	his	mock	 trial	with	 its	 guilty	verdict	 before	 the
“King”	and	we	 judge	his	 subsequent	banishment	 from	Harry’s	 side.	The	Act	 concludes	with
Prince	Hal,	England’s	new	“ostler”	(II.ii.40),	abandoning	Eastcheap	to	return	to	court	and	take
up	arms	against	the	Hotspur-led	rebellion.
Of	 course,	 while	 Falstaff	 is	 not	 formally	 banished	 by	 Henry	 until	 his	 coronation	 (2H4
V.v.47–72)	thus	making	good	on	Hal’s	“I	will,”	he	is	effectively	banished	from	Hal’s	company
here,	revealing	the	moral	severity	of	Hal’s	“I	do”	(1H4	II.iv.468).	For	with	the	exception	of	a
brief	chance	encounter	on	the	battlefield	at	Shrewsbury	(which	concludes	with	Hal	throwing	a
bottle	of	sack	at	Falstaff;	V.iii.57)	and	Hal’s	pathetic	eulogy	over	a	“dead”	Falstaff	later,	we
never	 see	 the	 two	 alone	 together	 again	 in	 any	 of	 the	 plays.	 If	 Hal	 has	 indeed	 effectively
banished	Falstaff	from	his	life	at	the	end	of	Act	2,	and	if	he	has	done	so	on	the	basis	of	a	new-
found	respect	for	a	lawful	order	that	leads	him	to	reject	Falstaff’s	critique	of	honor—that	is,	if
respect	for	the	lawful	order	has	been	restored	not	in	England	but	in	Hal	himself—then	we	must
wonder	what	happened	in	the	preceding	scene	to	effect	such	a	revolution.
This	question	and	the	preceding	treatment	of	the	ties	that	bind	men	to	each	other	are	framed
by	reflections	on	time	throughout	the	Act.	That	is,	they	are	framed	by	a	consideration	of	what
rightly	 orders	 men’s	 private	 and	 public	 affairs.	 For	 if	 carriers	 are	 to	 fulfill	 their	 charges
(II.i.1),	thieves	to	lay	their	traps	(II.i.32,	50–61),	rebels	to	manage	their	conspiracies	(II.iii.11,
35,	 65–66),	 kings	 to	 save	 their	 kingdoms	 (II.iv.282,	 320–26),	 and	 princes	 to	 go	 to	 war
(II.iv.92–97,	526)	then	all	must	take	accurate	measure	of	the	time.	To	be	sure,	knowing	when	to
spring	a	rebellion	is	no	easy	matter.	But	in	this	Act	even	the	simplest	effort	to	mark	the	time	is
difficult;	both	the	Carriers	and	Hal	are	unsure	of	the	correct	hour	(II.i.1,	34;	II.iv.92)	and	Hal
must	 remind	 the	 Sheriff	 that	 despite	 the	 darkness	 it	 is,	 according	 to	 the	 clock,	 morning
(II.iv.510–12)	and	thus	a	new	day.	By	raising	the	theme	of	political	disorder	within	the	context
of	difficulties	 telling	 the	 time,	 the	 reader	 is	 led	 to	wonder	 if	men	 should	 take	 their	bearings
from	the	movements	of	an	eternal	cosmic	order	(like	the	position	of	Ursa	Major:	II.i.2)9	or	by
man-made	conventions	 (like	 clocks):10	 Should	 the	 cosmos	or	man	be	 the	 source	of	 political
order?	 The	 opening	 reference	 to	 Ursa	 Major	 as	 Charlemagne’s	 wagon	 suggests	 a	 third
possibility,	one	repeated,	and	picked	up	by	Hal	later	on,	in	his	exchange	with	Francis	the	wine-
drawer	(“Michaelmas”:	II.iv.53).	Might	it	be	possible	for	a	figure,	a	la	Charles	the	Great,	to
join	the	two	authorities	and,	through	his	sheer	greatness	and	the	long	habit	of	customary	usage,
fix	his	name	to	the	enduring	cosmic	order	that	governs	men?	Given	his	own	stated	ambitions
(I.ii.188–210),	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	expect	that	Hal	would	find	in	a	disordered	England	the
opportunity	 to	 bring	 political	 customs	 into	 line	with	 a	 framework	 that	 exists	 independent	 of
human	agency.	A	man	who	finds	his	celestial	parallel	in	the	“Sun”	may	be	inclined	to	establish
himself	as	 the	arbiter	 (or	even	embodiment)	of	both	 the	heavenly	and	customary	orders,	 that
standard	by	which	both	the	heavens	and	men	mark	the	time	and	govern	political	life.11	It	is	thus
tempting	to	look	ahead	to	the	defining	moment	of	Hal’s	political	career—his	stunning	victory
over	 the	 French	 at	 Agincourt—and	 see	 in	 the	 political	 glories	 that	 he	 forever	 links	 to	 St.
Crispin’s	day	the	kind	of	political	calculation	anticipated	here	in	Act	2	of	Henry	IV,	Part	1.
To	 see	 how	 Hal	 might	 understand	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 cosmic	 and	 conventional
orders	 to	 prepare	 a	 path	 for	 his	 own	pursuit	 of	 glory,	we	need	 to	 turn	 to	 his	 exchange	with
Francis.	 While	 this	 passage	 has	 long	 been	 ignored,	 glossed	 as	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 Hal’s
“tricksterism”12	 and	 read	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 his	 sporting	 cruelty,13	 reconsideration	 of	 this	 episode
suggests	 its	 relevance	 to	 those	broader	political	 themes	whose	 treatment	unites	 the	Act	 as	 a
whole	and	reveals	it	as	an	important	step	in	the	self-education	of	the	Prince,	what	Hal	himself
calls	a	“precedent”	and	a	“pupil	age.”	In	his	exchange	with	the	wine-drawer	he	engages	in	a
close	study	of	those	hidden	springs	within	his	subjects	that	activate	their	devotional	capacities.
Through	this	engagement,	Hal	shows	that	he	knows	how	to	teach	himself	about	the	nature	of	his
subjects’	law-abidingness	and	their	willingness	to	serve	others.	Indeed,	he	learns	about	more
than	 just	 his	 subjects;	Hal’s	 interrogation	 of	 Francis	 helps	 to	 illuminate	 his	 own	 devotional
capacities	and	thus	his	own	dedication	to	politics.
No	Joking	Matter:	Taking	Hal’s	“Prank”	Seriously
At	 first	 blush,	 the	 episode	 in	question	 seems	 to	 justify	 its	 scholarly	neglect.	 It	 is	 filled	with
non-sequiturs,	 conversational	 stops	 and	 starts,	 bizarre	 and	 difficult	 to	 understand	 comments,
and	 seemingly	 inexplicable	 rhetorical	 twists.	 It	 never	 addresses	 the	question	 that	 inspired	 it
and	 ends	 abruptly	 with	 no	 clear	 or	 definable	 resolution.	 It	 is	 also	 one-sided,	 pitting	 the
hopelessly	overmatched	Francis	against	the	piercing	wit	and	wily	rhetoric	of	the	young	Prince.
The	 prank	 ends	 when	 Francis’	 master,	 the	 Vintner,	 interrupts	 with	 news	 that	 Falstaff	 and
company	have	arrived.	The	scene	then	turns	to	a	lengthy—and	at	times	hilarious—treatment	of
more	 obviously	 political	 themes.	When	 one	 compares	 the	 scene’s	 bizarre	 opening	 with	 the
more	 explicitly	 political	 episodes	 that	 follow,	we	might	 be	 inclined	 to	 do	 as	 so	many	 have
done	and	dismiss	it	as	a	crass	prank	on	Hal’s	part.
The	funny	thing	is,	as	a	joke,	this	stunt	doesn’t	play	very	well.	It	certainly	doesn’t	match	the
comedic	heights	 reached	by	Hal	 and	Falstaff	when	 they	 are	 together.	Even	Poins,	 no	 slouch
himself	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 a	 good	 gag	 (it	 was	 his	 idea	 for	 him	 and	 Hal	 to	 rob	 the	 robbers
Falstaff,	Bardolph,	Gadshill	and	Peto:	I.ii.155–60),	is	mystified	by	the	stunt.	Hal	on	the	other
hand	 seems	quite	 taken	with	 himself.	 In	 response	 to	Poins’s	 “what’s	 the	 issue?”	 he	 remarks
enigmatically,	“I	am	now	of	all	humors	that	have	showed	themselves	humors	since	the	old	days
of	goodman	Adam	 to	 the	pupil	 age	of	 this	present	 twelve	o’clock	at	midnight”	 (II.iv.89-91).
Hal’s	apparent	non-response	merely	heightens	our	curiosity	as	 to	what	 is	going	on	here.	The
absence	 of	 humor	 in	 an	 episode	 that	 everyone	 takes	 to	 be	 a	 prank	 conducted	 by	 one	 of
Shakespeare’s	consummate	tricksters	forces	us	to	take	another	look	at	their	exchange.
As	it	turns	out,	this	episode	takes	up	and	explores	the	very	same	reflections	that	are	treated
throughout	Act	2.	Hal’s	so-called	prank	takes	the	form	of	a	test	of	Francis’	contractual	fidelity,
with	 the	Prince	 inviting	 him	 to	 abandon	his	 professional	 obligations.	Not	 only	must	 Francis
respond	 to	Hal’s	browbeating,	but	with	Hal	 right	 in	 front	of	him	and	Poins	calling	from	off-
stage,	he	is	forced	to	choose	between	two	masters.	And	yet	to	discharge	successfully	his	duties
to	 the	 Vintner,	 Francis	 must	 serve	 both	 customers.	 The	 question	 is,	 can	 he	 satisfy	 both	 the
princely	lord	before	his	eyes	and	the	unseen	caller	from	without?	Or	will	he	have	to	choose	to
serve	one	over	the	other?	Such	questions	as	are	occasioned	by	this	exchange	allow	us	to	treat
the	passage	as	a	piece	of	the	broader	investigation	outlined	above.	But	what	is	perhaps	most
important	to	note	is	that	Hal’s	joke	is	intended	to	pass	the	time	until	Falstaff	arrives	for	their
agreed	upon	rendezvous	(II.iv.27–30).	And	yet,	just	after	the	prank,	when	Sir	Jack	shows	up,
the	Prince	tells	the	Vintner	to	make	Falstaff	and	company	wait	outside.	With	Falstaff’s	entrance
now	delayed,	Hal	first	comments	on	the	preceding	exchange	with	Poins,	then	inquires	about	the
time	 and	 then	 launches	 into	 an	 unprovoked	 and	 seemingly	 out	 of	 place	 tirade	 against	 the
character	 of	 Hotspur.	 Only	 after	 this,	 does	 Hal	 return	 his	 attention	 to	 his	 friends	 standing
outside	in	the	late	night	air.
Falstaff’s	 delayed	 entrance	 becomes	 all	 the	 more	 interesting	 in	 view	 of	 the	 peculiar
rhetoric	 deployed	 by	Hal	 here.	 For	while	 the	 pretext	 of	 this	 experiment	 is	 to	 discover	why
Francis	 gave	 him	 a	 penny’s	 worth	 of	 sugar,	 Hal	 never	 directly	 poses	 this	 question	 to	 his
interlocutor;	 instead,	 he	 approaches	 his	 target	 obliquely,	 only	 explicitly	 addressing	 the
tapster’s	 contractual	 obligations.	 Such	 rhetorical	 sleight	 of	 hand	betrays	 the	 influence	 of	 the
slippery	“Sir	Jack.”14	And	all	of	the	challenges	that	Hal	poses	in	his	interrogation	of	Francis
reflect	 Falstaff’s	 critique	 of	morality,	 a	Manichean	 view	 that	 pits	 an	 incoherent	 devotion	 to
others	against	a	thorough-going	selfishness	and	which	elevates	the	latter	over	the	former.	If	Hal
was	 Falstaff’s	 royal	 student,	 then	 why	 doesn’t	 the	 Prince	 welcome	 his	 teacher	 when	 he
arrives?	What	happened	in	the	discussion	with	the	wine-drawer	to	drive	a	wedge	between	the
future	King	and	his	so-called	friend?	To	address	these	questions	we	must	examine	his	various
rhetorical	sallies	in	detail.
Hal’s	Dialogue	with	Francis
Hal	begins	his	 interrogation	by	asking	how	long	Francis	 is	contracted	to	serve	 the	Vintner,	a
question	which	receives	a	surprising	“five	years	plus.”	Astonished	that	such	a	lowly	task	could
require	such	a	 lengthy	contract,	Hal	half	 teases	 the	bartender’s	assistant,	asking	 if	he	has	 the
courage	to	break	with	convention,	shun	his	contractual	obligations	and	earn	the	reputation	for
cowardice.	Hals’	rhetoric	here	sets	off	a	fiery	denial	by	the	bartender;	Francis	swears	on	all
the	Bibles	 in	England	that	he	would	do	no	such	thing!	No	mere	slave	to	 the	customs	of	men,
Francis’	 willingness	 to	 uphold	 his	 contractual	 obligations	 is	 supported	 by	 his	 belief	 in	 the
divine.	For	the	tapster,	God’s	authority	stands	behind	his	dedication	to	the	legal	customs	of	his
profession.
In	response	to	such	moral	seriousness,	Hal	ratchets	up	the	intensity	of	his	questions;	he	now
inquires	 about	 Francis’	 age.	 At	 first	 blush,	 this	 appears	 a	 non-sequitur.	 But	 it	 is	 virtually
impossible	to	point	to	one’s	age	without	leading	one	to	think	of	the	years	that	have	passed	and,
subsequently,	how	much	life	one	has	left.	Francis’	reference	to	Michaelmas	here	(his	presumed
birthday),	drives	this	reading	home.	Coming	as	it	does	near	the	autumnal	equinox,	Michaelmas
signals	 the	 onset	 of	 winter	 and	 the	 shortening	 of	 days.	 Hal	 thus	 introduces	 into	 their
conversation,	 ever	 so	 subtly,	 the	 specter	 of	 death.	 From	 Hal’s	 rhetorical	 perspective,	 the
rationale	 for	 such	a	move	should	be	clear:	by	getting	Francis	 to	 think	about	his	age	Hal	can
hope	to	get	him	to	reconsider	the	sensibility	of	his	decision	to	spend	five	years	or	more	of	his
life	 serving	 drinks	 as	 an	 indentured	 servant	 simply	 so	 that	 he	may	 become,	 of	 all	 things,	 a
bartender.	Hal’s	question	appears	 to	 touch	a	nerve	 for	 the	wine-drawer	however,	 for	 it	 is	at
this	point	that	Francis,	who	put	off	the	first	three	calls	from	Poins,	now	takes	advantage	of	the
fourth	and	tries	to	extricate	himself	from	the	Prince’s	interrogation,	turning	at	long	last	to	serve
the	unseen	voice	calling	from	without.
Faced	with	the	premature	end	of	his	game,	Hal	must	keep	Francis’	attentions	squarely	on
him.	 He	 does	 so	 now	 by	 mentioning	 the	 sugar	 and	 inquiring	 into	 its	 worth.	 Given	 an
opportunity	to	discuss	his	generosity,	Francis	stays	put.	Indeed,	he	does	more	than	just	stay—he
trumpets	his	virtue,	replying	that	he	wishes	he	could	have	given	two	penny’s	worth	of	sugar!
Such	self-flattery	provides	Hal	his	new	opening.	For	 if	attention	paid	 to	Francis’	virtue	will
keep	him	at	Hal’s	side,	that	is,	if	a	return	on	his	virtue	is	what	he	seeks	and	if	such	a	return	will
delay	his	 turn	 to	 that	 “other”	 competing	 authority,	 then	Hal	 intends	 to	do	Francis	one	better.
Instead	of	praising	his	kindness,	Hal	offers	him	a	thousand	pounds	for	a	penny’s	worth	of	sugar.
By	 doing	 so,	 Hal	 not	 only	 praises	 him	 for	 his	 virtue,	 but	 makes	 it	 financially	 possible	 for
someone	like	Francis	to	leave	behind	indentured	servitude	for	good.	Hal	thus	aims	to	eliminate
whatever	material	 need	 that	might	 have	 been	 the	 source	 of	 such	 dedication.	Now	 Francis’s
immediate	response	to	this	offer	(“Anon,	anon”)	is	ambiguous,	intended	more	it	seems	for	his
unseen	 caller	 than	 it	 is	 for	Hal.	 But	Hal	 exploits	 this	 ambiguity	 to	 pretend	 that	 Francis	 has
accepted	 this	 insanely	 large	 windfall.	 And	 it	 seems	 Hal	 employs	 this	 pretense	 because	 it
allows	him	to	push	the	rhetorical	point	he	raised	earlier.	By	pretending	that	Francis	will	take
the	excessive	financial	gift,	Hal	can,	half-accusingly,	ask	if	he	will	rob	his	master,	the	Vintner.
Francis	is	confused;	he	doesn’t	know	what	to	make	of	this	sudden	turn	in	the	conversation.
Such	confusion	is	understandable.	Once	again,	Hal’s	sharp	comments	seem	to	come	out	of
the	blue.	And	yet,	once	again,	placed	in	their	proper	rhetorical	context,	they	afford	the	Prince
an	 opportunity	 to	 explore	 more	 deeply	 Francis’	 willingness	 to	 serve	 others.	 Hal	 began	 by
tempting	 Francis	 to	 abandon	 his	 apprenticeship;	 five	 years	 or	 more	 of	 menial	 labor	 hardly
seemed	worth	the	bartending	payoff.	While	Francis	rejected	this	offer	in	the	strongest	possible
terms,	we	discover	here	 that	he	gives	away	 the	Vintner’s	 sugar	 free	of	charge.	And	he	even
seems	willing	 to	 accept	 a	massive	gift	 for	 such	minor	kindness,	 one	 that	he	produced	at	 the
expense	of	his	master.	If	Francis	is	willing	to	accept	a	gift	out	of	all	proportion	with	his	minor
decency,	as	Hal	here	seems	to	think,	and	if	a	return	on	his	virtue	is	what	will	keep	him	at	the
Prince’s	side,	then	Hal	might	have	good	reason	to	suspect	that	what	moves	his	interlocutor	is
not	a	concern	with	propriety	as	such	but	self-interest.	But	if	Francis’	good	deed	was	motivated
by	a	desire	for	a	reward	of	some	sort,	then	it	is	not	so	unreasonable	to	wonder,	as	Hal	seems
to,	if	it	would	be	more	sensible	to	just	“go	for	the	gold”	without	serving	others.	If	what	Francis
really	wants	is	a	reward	for	his	virtue,	then	he	should	just	steal	from	the	tavern	owner	and	cut
out	the	moral	middle-man.	The	student	of	Falstaff	seems	to	have	learned	his	lesson	well.
Hal’s	 follow	up	 remarks,	where	he	 rebukes	 the	waiter	 for	his	mulish	attachment	 to	duty,
confirm	these	observations	as	his	own.	For	if	Francis	is	not	willing	 to	steal	from	the	Vintner
(as	it	seems	he	isn’t),	then	he	might	as	well	remain	a	waiter.	If	serving	others	is	all	he	wants	to
do,	then	he	should	remain	content	with	his	lowly	station	and	attend	to	Poins	now.	From	Hal’s
Falstaffian	 perspective	 a	 more	 consistent,	 and	 thus	 more	 rational,	 approach	 would	 require
Francis	 either	 to	 embrace	 service	 completely	 or	 to	 “be	 a	man”	 and	 pursue	 gain	 limitlessly.
There	 is	 then	a	certain	 justice	 in	Hal	 here	 calling	Francis	 a	 “rogue.”	For	 if	 the	bartender’s
assistant	 is	 going	 to	 cling	 resolutely	 to	 the	 virtues	 of	 serving	 others	while	 at	 the	 same	 time
consistently	 refusing	 to	 serve	 his	 customer,	 Poins,	 then	 either	 he	 lacks	 the	 most	 basic	 self
awareness	or	he	is	a	hypocrite	and	a	scoundrel.	The	scene	reaches	its	denouement	when	both
the	 Prince	 and	 Poins	 call	 Francis	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 rendering	 the	 poor	man	 speechless	 and
immobile.	The	 tension	 is	 resolved	by	 the	 sudden	appearance	of	 the	Vintner	who	advises	his
apprentice	to	“attend	to	the	guests	within”	(II.iv.79).
We	are	now	in	a	better	position	to	see	how	the	exchange	just	studied	constitutes	a	fitting
substitute	for	the	original	interest	in	the	“under-skinker’s”	generosity.	Hal’s	line	of	questioning
aims	more	at	plumbing	the	depths	of	Francis’s	devotional	qualities	and	exploring	the	motives
behind	such	devotion	than	it	does	at	playing	a	joke.	It	is	precisely	the	capacity	for	selflessness
that	is	at	the	heart	of	generosity	and	devotion	to	others.	By	exploring	the	latter,	he	can	address
his	original	stated	interest	in	the	former.	And	since	Francis	seems	capable	of	articulating	little
more	than	“Anon,	anon,”	Hal’s	indirect	interrogation	promises	to	be	much	more	fruitful	than	a
direct	query	of	a	man	so	verbally	challenged.	By	studying	what	pressures	will	and	won’t	work
on	Francis’	attachments	to	the	Vintner	and	to	his	sense	of	duty,	by	exploring	what	will	keep	him
by	 the	Prince’s	 side	and	what	may	drive	him	 towards	his	unseen	caller,	Hal	can	experiment
with	those	psychological	levers	that	all	successful	rulers	need	to	master.
The	Politics	of	Cynicism
In	 the	most	 literal	 reading	 of	 the	 passage,	Hal,	 as	 a	 customer,	 tests	 Francis’	 attention	 to	 his
lowly	duties	and	to	his	master,	by	having	another	customer	call	from	a	by-room.	To	fulfill	his
responsibilities,	 Francis	must	 attend	 to	 both	men	without	 also	 somehow	 alienating	 them.	To
satisfy	one	at	the	expense	of	the	other	is	to	fail	in	his	duties.	But	Francis	is	more	than	just	the
apprentice	of	 the	Vintner.	He	 is	 also	 subject	 to	 the	crown,	 the	heir	 to	which	 sits	before	him
demanding—playfully	to	be	sure,	but	demanding	nonetheless—that	he	respond	to	his	questions.
Hal	thus	represents	political	authority	in	England	at	a	time	when	the	legitimacy	of	that	authority
is	 in	 question.	 Given	 his	 carousing	 in	 Eastcheap	with	 the	 likes	 of	 Falstaff,	 this	 description
seems	all	too	apt	for	Hal.	But	if	Hal	is	the	stand-in	for	a	disordered	and	distempered	England,
then	 what	 are	 we	 to	 make	 of	 Poins,	 his	 partner	 in	 crime?	 As	 the	 unseen	 caller	 constantly
reminding	Francis	of	his	duties	over	and	against	those	of	a	corrupt	political	order,	Poins	would
seem	 to	 represent	 God.	 Shakespeare’s	 use	 of	 religious	 imagery	 strewn	 throughout	 these
hundred	 lines15	 invites	 his	 audience	 to	 think	 of	 the	 Almighty	 and	 to	 find	 Him	 symbolically
represented	in	Poins’	invisible	but	noisy	presence.
Read	this	way,	the	scene	seems	to	suggest	a	deeply	cynical	political	lesson.	It	shows	how
the	political	order	keeps	men	like	Francis	from	turning	fully	to	their	ethical	or	spiritual	duties
by	getting	 them	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 rewards	 for	 service.	Hal	 demonstrates	 how	he	 can	keep	his
subjects	 bound	 to	 him	when	 they	 are	 tempted	 by	 the	 calls	 of	 morality,	 law	 and	 duty	 to	 do
otherwise.	 Perhaps	 even	more	 troubling,	 the	 scene	 also	 shows	 us	 how	Hal	 can	manipulate
religious	authority	(i.e.,	using	Poins	to	“embody”	the	call	of	God)	to	serve	his	own	interests.
But	 in	 the	 end,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 Francis	 does	 completely	 side	 with	 Hal.	 For	 while	 Hal
dominates	the	conversation,	Francis’	attention	is	clearly	split.	As	the	conclusion	suggests,	the
tension	between	political	and	religious	authority	doesn’t	seem	fully	resolved	in	favor	of	either;
by	attending	to	the	“guests	within”	Francis	serves	neither	Hal	nor	Poins.
It	may	be	 that,	as	 in	 the	more	 literal	 reading,	Francis	cannot	hope	 to	 fulfill	his	 legal	and
ethical	responsibilities	without	serving	in	some	way	both	masters.	After	all,	the	political	order,
diseased	as	it	may	be,	still	has	some	claim	on	men’s	devotions.	One	would	certainly	be	hard
pressed	 to	explain	how	 the	wholesale	 rejection	of	political	authority,	 and	 the	 instability	and
insecurity	that	follow	in	its	wake,	could	be	consistent	with	what	moral	conduct	requires.	The
abandonment	of	a	political	community,	especially	one	in	need	of	moral	refurbishment,	would
be	nothing	less	than	an	abdication	of	one’s	moral	charge.	And	yet	one	cannot	simply	identify
with	and	slavishly	serve	the	corrupt	ends	of	a	corrupt	community.	Christian	ethics	would	seem
to	require	that	one	avoid	the	bad	examples	set	by	the	new	King	and	his	rambunctious	son	while
still	preserving	respect	for	a	genuinely	lawful	order.	As	such,	the	various	appeals	designed	to
keep	Francis	from	leaving	Hal’s	side—appeals	to	money,	shame,	vanity,	and	fear—do	not	get
Francis	to	drop	his	apprenticeship	and	set	aside	a	life	of	service.	The	guileless	Francis	is	not
so	 willing	 to	 view	 fidelity	 to	 contracts	 and	 lawfulness	 as	 a	 means	 to	 some	 other	 end;	 he
doesn’t	understand	service	to	others	to	be	merely	instrumental.
By	bringing	Francis’s	moral	stubbornness	to	light,	Hal	can	see	more	fully	the	rootedness	of
customs	 and	 conventions	 within	 a	 human	 nature	 uncorrupted	 by	 the	moral	 sophistry	 that	 he
employs	here	and	that	Falstaff	employs	elsewhere.	The	insight	into	such	rootedness	seems	to
constitute	 a	 rare	 but	 important	 exception	 in	 Hal’s	 political	 education.	 For	 while	 Hal’s
education—from	his	usurper	father	and	his	debunking	teacher—has	taught	him	the	flexibility	of
human	customs	and	conventions,	the	treatment	of	Francis	here	shows	him	the	extent	to	which	a
nature	impervious	to	his	rhetoric	doggedly	clings	to	serving	others	as	an	end	in	itself.	It	shows
him	the	need	within	human	nature	for	a	limit	external	to	human	agency,	one	that	is	sacred	and
which	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 legitimate	 restraint	 on	what	would	otherwise	be	 a	 limitless	 pursuit	 of
self-interest.	 According	 to	 this	 insight,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 concede	 that	 some	 of	 the	 laws	 that
govern	our	political,	moral,	 familial	and	spiritual	 lives	may	 indeed	be	 the	product	of	human
creation.	But	 their	very	existence	 testifies	 to	 an	enduring	need	 for	 them,	a	need	 rooted	deep
within	the	human	condition.	One	can	thus	see	the	psychological	origins	of	the	rhetoric	used	so
convincingly	at	Agincourt	where,	as	King,	Henry	appeals	to	immortal	glory	to	inspire	his	men
to	defeat	the	vastly	superior	French	forces.16
The	Recovery	of	Political	Devotion
One	might	conclude	that	all	we	have	shown	is	that	Hal	has	learned	(or	reconfirmed)	a	well-
worn	 Machiavellian	 insight:	 most	 men	 are	 attached	 to	 some	 notion	 of	 justice	 and	 as	 such
require	 their	 rulers	 to	 act,	 or	 at	 least	 appear	 to	 act,	 in	 accordance	 with	 such	 a	 moral
understanding.	Because	men	like	Francis	may	stubbornly	cling	to	the	dignity	of	law,	contracts,
and	religion,	the	man	who	would	rule	them	must	understand	that	he	may	not	blithely	do	away
with	all	moral	pretenses.	He	must,	at	the	least,	appear	to	be	just.	But	we	would	be	remiss	to
conclude	 that	 the	 attachment	 to	 legal,	 ethical	 and	 spiritual	 authorities	 at	 play	 in	 Francis
characterizes	only	blue-collar	simpletons,	and	not,	say,	worldly	wise	royalty	like	Hal	or	even
moral	degenerates	 like	Falstaff.	After	all,	Hal,	 like	Francis,	gives	away	his	sugar	 to	“Sweet
Ned”	Poins	(II.iv.21–22).	Hal	promises	Francis	a	tip	so	large	that	to	call	it	generous	would	be
an	understatement.	And	Hal,	like	Francis	again,	refuses	to	forego	his	political	vocation—a	life
that	requires	him	to	serve	others—in	order	to	enjoy	all	the	pleasures	that	come	from	friendship
with	Falstaff	 and	a	 life	of	 cavorting	at	 the	Boar’s	Head	 tavern.17	Perhaps	 then	 for	Hal,	 too,
something	divine	authorizes	his	own	dedication	to	a	life	spent	in	pursuit	of	political	honor	and
glory.
But	 if,	 to	one	way	of	 thinking,	Francis	might	be	said	 to	 represent	“the	Prince”	here,	 then
Hal,	with	his	indecent	temptations	of	Francis,	his	seemingly	casual	treatment	of	contracts	and
law,	his	emphasis	on	self-interest	at	the	expense	of	moral	duty,	to	say	nothing	of	the	fantastic
rhetorical	 skills	on	display,	 calls	 to	mind	Falstaff.	 In	 this	particular	 reading,	 “the	Prince”	 is
tempted	by	“Falstaff.”	Poins,	on	the	other	hand,	with	his	persistent	reminders	that	“the	Prince”
turn	his	attention	 to	his	responsibilities,	clearly	represents	 the	demands	of	Hal’s	father,	King
Henry	IV.	Read	in	this	way,	Hal,	playing	“Falstaff,”	can	perhaps	gain	some	insight	into	what	it
is	 within	 his	 own	 soul	 that	 allows	 him	 to	 resist	 the	 unrestrained	 pleasures	 afforded	 by	 the
lawless	 life	 in	 Eastcheap;	 it	 allows	 him	 to	 see	 that	 his	 dedication	 to	 politics	 is	 not	 rooted
simply	 in	 custom	 or	 accident—the	 adventitious	 consequence	 of	 being	 the	 great-grandson	 to
King	Edward	III—but	in	a	nature	independent	of	human	making.	While	“the	Prince”	may	dally
with	 “Falstaff”	 his	 attentions	 here	 are	 split	 and	 he	 is	 ultimately	 kept	 from	 embracing	 the
Falstaffian	critique	of	 lawfulness	by	a	nature	 that	 remains	stubbornly	dedicated	 to	 the	active
political	life	over	and	above	the	blandishments	offered	by	Eastcheap.	Hal	thus	investigates	that
Hotspur-like	attachment	to	honor	which	prevents	him	from	ever	taking	the	Eastcheap	gang	too
seriously	(I.ii.185–207).18
In	this	reading	of	the	passage,	as	with	the	previous	two,	Francis	is	torn	because	the	figures
represented	 by	 Hal	 and	 Poins	 both	make	 legitimate	 claims	 on	 his	 attention:	 to	 perform	 his
duties	he	has	to	serve	both	men.	The	Falstaffian	concerns	expressed	by	Hal	legitimately	claim
his	attentions	because,	 as	 intimated	by	Hal	 to	Francis,	we	have	only	one	 life	 to	 live	on	 this
earth.	Given	 the	certainty	of	our	mortality	here	(and	 the	uncertainty	of	what	happens	after)	 it
seems	positively	inhuman	to	disregard	all	sensual	and	material	concerns.	When	he	is	King,	Hal
will	need	to	respond	to	such	demands	if	he	is	to	fulfill	his	responsibilities;	after	all,	how	can
he	hope	to	rule	others	well	if	he	is	insufficiently	attentive	to	the	needs	of	the	body	or	the	human
concerns	 with	 the	 here	 and	 now?	 Indeed,	 Hal	 himself	 must	 address	 these	 concerns	 if	 only
because	the	success	of	his	political	enterprises	requires	an	heir	who	will	preserve,	consolidate
and	perhaps	even	extend	his	conquests	 (H5	V.ii.204–8).	And	 that	 requires	 that	he	be	 around
long	enough	to	prepare	such	an	heir	for	his	considerable	tasks;	his	mortality	and	thus	what	will
happen	after	he	dies	looms	as	a	concern	for	Hal	in	a	way	that	it	never	does	for	the	eternally
youthful	Falstaff.
It	seems	precisely	this	very	anti-Falstaffian	concern	with	life	after	one’s	death	that	proves
so	crucial	to	Hal’s	dedication	to	political	activity	and	to	his	concern	for	the	dignity	that	can	be
found	in	a	restored	political	order.	To	be	clear,	Shakespeare	gives	us	no	clear	evidence	that
Hal,	 like	 his	 father,	 believes	 in	 an	 immortal	 soul	 or	 a	 God	 who	 doles	 out	 rewards	 and
punishments	 in	 the	 next	 world.	 The	 night	 before	 Agincourt,	 the	 English	 soldier	 Williams
remarks	to	his	fellow	soldiers,	Bates	and	Court,	and	to	a	disguised	Henry	that	on	that	“latter
day”	the	King	shall	bear	responsibility	for	all	those	who	might	die	on	his	behalf	in	an	unjust
cause	(H5	IV.i.134–46).	But	Henry	demurs;	according	to	the	King’s	carefully	limited	response,
God	judges	men	here,	in	this	life:	“War	is	his	beadle,	war	is	his	vengeance;	so	that	here	men
are	punished”	 (IV.i.168–69,	 emphasis	mine).	 In	 claiming	 that	 the	King	 is	 no	more	 “guilty	 of
their	damnation	than	he	was	guilty	before	of	 those	impieties	for	which	they	are	now	visited”
(IV.i.174–76,	emphasis	added),	Henry	does	no	more	than	to	suggest	that	their	damnation	is	the
untimely	deaths	they	suffer	on	the	field	of	battle.	And	in	his	solitary	prayer	that	follows,	Henry
distinguishes	the	“contrite	tears”	that	he	bestowed	on	Richard’s	corpse	from	those	priests	who
“sing	still	for	Richard’s	soul”	(IV.i.299,	emphasis	mine).	Finally,	Henry	prays	that	the	“God	of
battles”	 will	 not	 punish	 him	 tomorrow	 for	 the	 sins	 of	 his	 father,	 a	 concern	 that	 would	 be
groundless	 if	he	believed	his	father’s	soul	was	capable	of	paying	for	such	sins	after	he	died
(IV.i.286–302).	While	Henry	V	never	openly	denies	the	possibility	of	divine	retribution	in	the
afterlife,	his	most	explicit	 remarks	on	 the	subject	 reflect	a	studied	ambiguity,	 limiting	divine
punishment	to	this	earthly	realm.
And	yet	even	if	Henry	V	does	reject	the	soul’s	immortality,	Shakespeare’s	presentation	of
this	royal’s	famous	career	does	not	lead	us	to	conclude	that	he	thereby	rejects	a	moral	order
circumscribed	by	 certain	 sacred	 limits.	After	 all,	Hal	 remains	 attuned	 to	 the	 possibility	 that
political	greatness	can	lend	an	enduring	dignity	to	the	life	of	man.	Thus	in	his	St.	Crispin’s	day
speech	we	see	King	Henry	V	speak	of	the	glory	to	be	won	and	enjoyed	by	those	who	will	live
through	 the	 battle,	 a	 glory	 to	 be	 enjoyed	 by	 them	while	 they	 are	 alive	 partly	 because	 they
envision	 it	 lasting	 after	 they	 die;	 the	 very	 prospect	 of	 one’s	 mortality	 makes	 attractive	 the
immortal	glory	he	promises.	For	Henry	IV	by	contrast,	a	God	who	judges	our	immortal	souls
always	 overshadows	 the	 greatness	 of	 political	 life	 even	 at	 its	 peak.	 It	 is	 precisely	 this
possibility	which	 torments	 the	King	 throughout	both	Henry	IV	plays,	 leading	him	at	 times	 to
despair	of	“the	crooked	ways”	by	which	he	came	to	the	throne,	at	other	times	to	advocate	such
measures	openly.
For	Falstaff,	 the	possibility	that	a	moral	order	exists	capable	of	ennobling	men	is	simply
derisible;	despite	all	of	his	legendary	intellectual	firepower,	Falstaff	seems	closed	to	certain
human	and	political	questions	in	a	way	that	Hal	does	not.	As	a	result	he	falls	prey	to	the	moral
beliefs	that	he	takes	so	much	joy	in	deriding.	Sir	Jack	bears	the	moral	mark	of	a	world	class
boaster—a	man	who	debunks	all	that	men	admire	so	that	he	himself	may	earn	their	admiration.
Falstaff’s	public	critique	of	morality	allows	him	to	display	his	cleverness,	his	daring	(see	1H4
II.iv.45)	and	thus,	paradoxically,	his	ability	to	consult	more	than	his	own	self-interests!19	There
is	perhaps	no	greater	evidence	of	Falstaff’s	attachment	to	ordinary	moral	conventions	than	the
discovery,	 at	 the	 close	 of	Act	 2	 scene	 4	 of	Henry	 IV,	Part	 1,	 that	 he	 carries	 on	 his	 person
receipts	for	what	he	owes	others	(II.iv.516–22).	These	attachments	resurface	in	Henry	IV,	Part
2,	where	Falstaff	“valiantly”	protects	Doll	Tearsheet	from	Pistol’s	rage	(2H4	 II.iv.133–208),
and	in	Henry	V	where	Hostess	Quickly	reports	that	on	his	deathbed	Falstaff	railed	against	the
women	and	booze	he	spent	his	life	chasing	(H5	II.iii.26–37).	One	has	to	wonder	whether	a	man
who	 claims	 to	 be	 liberated	 from	 the	 charade	 of	 human	 customs,	 who	 believes	 honor	 to	 be
“air,”	 and	who	 is	 reputed	 to	 possess	 such	 intellectual	 clarity	 that	 he	 is	 likened	 by	 some	 to
Socrates,	would	keep	track	of	his	debts,	display	chivalry	at	sword’s	point	and	denounce	at	the
end	of	his	life	what	he	spent	most	of	it	pursuing.
In	 the	end,	 the	Prince	 is	more	aware	of	his	political	attachments	 than	Falstaff	and	thus	 is
more	self-aware.20	This	 is	perhaps	why	he	 is	able	 to	 learn	from	Francis	and	why	Falstaff	 is
unable	to	learn	from	Hal.	This	might	also	explain	Hal’s	decision	to	delay	Falstaff’s	entrance	to
the	 tavern;	until	he	has	concluded	his	experiment	with	Poins,	his	boisterous	friends	can	wait
outside	a	bit	longer	(1H4	II.iv.81).	And	that	means	that	Hal’s	famous	break	with	Falstaff	does
not	take	place	at	the	end	of	Henry	IV,	Part	2.	It	occurs	here,	in	the	wake	of	his	much	neglected
experiment	with	Francis,	an	episode	which	anticipates	the	more	celebrated	theatrics	between
Falstaff	and	the	Prince	later	in	this	scene	(II.iv.366-468),	a	drama	that	itself	ends	with	Sir	Jack
“banished”	and	with	Hal	somewhere	between	the	worlds	of	Eastcheap	and	his	father’s	royal
court.	 It	 is	 perhaps	 worth	 recalling	 in	 this	 context	 that	 Francis,	 by	 tending	 to	 the	 “guests
within,”	 serves	 neither	 “Falstaff”	 nor	 “Henry	 IV”—Hal,	 it	 seems,	 must	 consult	 his	 own
understanding	 of	 the	 dignity	 of	 politics.	When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 nobility	 of	 political	 life,	Hal
stands	between	Falstaff	and	his	father.	By	doing	so	he	stands	above	them.
Hal	and	Friendship
By	the	end	of	the	opening	of	Act	2	scene	4	of	Henry	IV,	Part	1,	Hal	has	effectively	banished
Falstaff	 from	 his	 company	 and	 he	 has	 done	 so	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 his	 new	 appreciation	 of	 the
rootedness	of	customs	and	conventions	in	a	nature	uncorrupted	by	Falstaff’s	moral	debunking.
Of	course,	Hal	informs	us	early	on	that	he	will	use	the	Eastcheap	crowd	to	serve	his	broader
political	 designs.	 Later	 he	 “honors”	 Sir	 John	 with	 a	 charge	 of	 infantry	 whose	 command	 is
likely	to	risk	the	life	of	this	obese,	gout-plagued	knight,	an	ugly	speculation	supported	by	his
pathetic	eulogy	over	a	“dead”	Falstaff	(1H4	V.iv.101–9).	Finally,	once	crowned,	he	does	not
hesitate	 to	banish	Falstaff	from	his	company	and	to	order	 the	Chief	Justice	 to	 throw	him	and
those	with	him	into	prison.	Hal	may	have	always	enjoyed	a	kind	of	distance	from	Falstaff.21
But	such	questions	about	the	sincerity	this	friendship	do	not	entitle	us	to	conclude	that	Hal
has	no	friends.	There	is,	after	all,	Ned	Poins.	Whereas	Hal	and	Falstaff	mix	blistering	insults
with	friendly	banter,	Hal	and	Ned	only	speak	“sweetly”	 to	each	other.	Of	 the	 three	practical
jokes	we	witness	Hal	perpetrate	in	Eastcheap—all	of	which	come	at	the	expense	of	Falstaff—
Ned	is	the	only	one	“in”	on	all	three	and	is	the	architect	of	the	first	and	the	last.	Perhaps	most
importantly,	it	is	only	with	Ned	that	Hal,	that	consummate	political	actor,	lowers	his	guard	and
unburdens	 himself	 regarding	his	 concerns	 for	 his	 father’s	 health,	 an	 opening	prepared	by	 an
expression	 of	 intimacy	 that	 is	 so	 startling	 and	 so	 out	 of	 character	 that	most	 scholars	 simply
ignore	it.22	Unprovoked,	Hal	confesses	to	Poins	that	he	is	“exceeding	weary”	and	that	such
humble	considerations	make	me	out	of	love	with	my	greatness.	What	a	disgrace	is	it	to	me	to	remember	thy	name!	or	to
know	they	face	tomorrow!	Or	to	take	note	of	how	many	pair	of	silk	stockings	thou	hast—viz.	these	and	those	that	were
they	peach-colored	ones!	or	to	bear	the	inventory	of	thy	shirts—as,	one	for	superfluity,	and	another	for	use!	But	that	the
tennis-court	keeper	knows	better	 than	I,	 for	 it	 is	a	 low-ebb	of	 linen	with	 thee	when	 thou	keepest	not	 racket	 there;	as
thou	has	not	done	a	great	while.	(2H4	II.ii.11–21)
The	attention	paid	by	the	normally	detached	Prince	to	the	minor	details	of	Ned’s	wardrobe	and
tennis	habits	betrays	 an	 intimacy	 that	 is	 arresting.	For	not	 even	at	 the	deathbed	of	his	 father
does	the	Prince	offer	such	an	open	display	of	affection,	choosing	instead	to	weep	in	private.
Rather,	Hal	 confides	 to	Ned:	 “Marry,	 I	 tell	 thee	 it	 is	 not	meet	 that	 I	 should	 be	 sad	 now	my
father	is	sick;	albeit	I	could	tell	to	thee,	as	to	one	it	pleases	me	for	fault	of	a	better	to	call	my
friend,	 I	 could	 be	 sad”	 (2H4	 II.ii.38–41,	 emphasis	 added;	 see	 2H4	 II.ii.60).	 It	 is	 perhaps
because	Falstaff	himself	is	aware	of	such	intimacy	that	he	tries	to	undermine	Hal’s	affection	for
Ned	(2H4	II.ii.119–23).	In	the	end,	Hal’s	true	friend	is	neither	his	equal	in	love	of	honor	nor
his	equal	in	the	battle	of	wits.
That	Hal	discloses	his	grief	over	his	father’s	mortal	 illness	in	the	context	of	proclaiming
his	friendship	for	Ned	is	not	surprising.	Falstaff’s	materialism	empties	human	relationships	of
their	substance	and	meaning,	making	it	impossible	for	him	to	take	seriously	here	Hal’s	private
passions.	Hal	knows	 this,	despite	Falstaff’s	many	proclamations	of	 love	for	him.	He	 is	 fully
aware	 that	 Falstaff’s	 rejection	 of	 the	 soul’s	 immortality	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 his	 shaky
judgment	that	there	is	simply	no	soul	and	thus	no	dignity	to	human	and	political	life.	The	only
other	time	we	see	from	Hal	a	spontaneous	display	of	emotion—and	perhaps	the	only	time	we
see	 him	 angry—is	when	 he	 throws	 at	 Falstaff	 the	 bottle	 of	 sack	 he	 had	 playfully	 given	 the
Prince	on	the	field	at	Shrewsbury;	failure	to	take	seriously	politics	at	its	most	serious	wins	Sir
Jack	the	wrath	of	the	Prince.	Of	course,	despite	all	of	his	mockery,	Falstaff	may	genuinely	love
Hal.	 But	 Falstaff	 will	 never	 be	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	 depths	 or	 origins	 of	 such	 passion.	 The
intellectual	 consistency	 demanded	 by	 his	materialism	will	 always	 force	 him	 to	 chalk	 up	 to
“medicines”	anything	smacking	of	altruism.
It	is	not	for	friendship	then,	but	for	a	kind	of	dialectical	mastery,	that	the	Prince	serves	as
apprentice	to	his	bawdy	vintner.	As	Falstaff	himself	declares	“I	am	not	only	witty	in	myself	but
the	cause	 that	wit	 is	 in	other	men”	 (2H4	 I.ii.8–9).	He	 is	 indeed	a	world-class	 rhetorician,	a
master	 wordsmith	 whose	 medium	 is	 allusion	 and	 double-entendre,	 capable	 of	 inverting
meanings,	bending	language	and	reworking	literary	allusions	to	suit	the	needs	of	the	moment.23
But	 it	 is	 not	merely	 verbal	 dexterity	 that	Hal	 picks	 up	 from	 “Monsieur	Remorse.”	What	 he
learns	 is	 the	 Falstaffian	 calling	 card—how	 to	 use	 speech	 to	 evade	 or	 conceal	 personal
responsibility.	Such	rhetoric	isn’t	simply	to	avoid	trouble;	it	is,	rather,	the	means	by	which	he
preserves	and	advances	a	restored	reputation.24
But	if	the	capacity	for	moral	evasion	is	what	the	young	Prince	hopes	to	get	from	his	verbal
sparring	with	Falstaff,	then	what	does	he	get,	or	hope	to	get,	from	his	time	with	Poins?	What	is
it	that	this	particular	friendship	brings	the	future	King	of	England?	If	the	passage	noted	above
provides	any	guidance,	then	we	might	conclude	that	Hal’s	friendship	with	Poins	allows	him	to
un-burden	 himself,	 at	 least	 temporarily,	 of	 the	 pressures	 that	 come	 with	 his	 playing	 such	 a
sustained	and	intricate	ruse,	albeit	one	designed	to	win	him	a	fame	that	will	last	as	long	as	the
world	(H5	IV.iii.51–60).	For	the	path	to	glory	that	Hal	has	charted	for	himself	(1H4	 I.ii.185–
207)	and	which	he	conducts	over	the	course	of	three	dramas,	requires	a	dissembling	whose	on-
stage	duration	enjoys	no	parallel	in	Shakespeare’s	dramatic	corpus.	To	be	sure,	as	both	Prince
and	King,	Hal	seems	to	pull	off	his	plan	with	considerable	success.	But	Hal’s	“confession”	to
Poins	here	suggests	that	such	a	single-minded	pursuit	of	his	own	glory	comes	at	great	personal
cost	to	him;	it	requires	that	he	deny	to	both	his	father	and	his	friend	the	open	acknowledgment
of	his	attachments	to	them,	that	he	refuse	to	discharge	what	human	sentiment	naturally	demands
of	 us.	 For	 if	 he	weeps	 for	 his	 father,	 he	will	 be	 called	 a	 hypocrite,	 a	 charge	which	would
render	 suspect	 his	 long-planned	 self-revelation;	 thinking	 him	 disingenuous,	 people	 would
assume	that	his	personal	transformation	was	mere	spin,	a	ploy	designed	to	win	their	approval.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 if	 he	 were	 to	 give	 full	 rein	 to	 his	 friendship	 with	 Poins,	 he	 would	 be
disgraced	in	his	own	eyes	as	an	aspirant	to	political	greatness;	a	man	concerned	with	his	own
fame	and	 the	glory	of	his	nation	does	not	preoccupy	himself	with	“small	beer”	or	 the	 tennis
rackets,	silk-stockings,	and	linen-shirts	of	others	(2H4	II.ii.1–27).	And	yet,	it	is	precisely	his
friendship	 with	 Poins	 that	 allows	 him	 to	 set	 aside,	 if	 only	 momentarily,	 his	 self-interested
pursuit	of	fame	and	to	reveal,	and	thereby	partially	relieve,	the	wearisome	situation	that	he	has
constructed	for	himself.	Because	of	this	there	is	something	“sweet”	to	the	relationship	between
Hal	and	Poins	(1H4	I.ii.107,	152,	II.iv.20–21),	something	not	unlike	the	gift	of	Francis’	sugar
to	 the	 Prince,	 especially	 insofar	 as	 such	 “sweet”	 generosity	 seems	 capable	 of	 producing	 a
pleasure	 in	 both	 the	 giver	 and	 the	 recipient	 that	 can	 overpower	 considerations	 of	 low	 self-
interest.25
These	reflections	on	Hal,	Falstaff	and	Poins	suggest	an	important	link	between	Hal’s	nearly
scandalous	political	ambitions	and	 the	possibility	of	genuine	 friendship.	For	despite	 the	 fact
that	 Hal’s	 political	 pursuits	 and	 his	 friendships	 clearly	 serve	 his	 self-interests,	 they	 also
require	him	to	recognize	a	good	outside	of	himself	that	he	lacks	and	whose	possession	requires
him	to	moderate	his	conduct,	to	consult	the	welfare	of	others	and	thereby	avoid	the	solipsism
that	 makes	 friendship	 impossible	 and	 turns	 statesmanship	 into	 tyranny.	 Hal’s	 most	 private
pursuits	 must	 necessarily	 possess	 a	 “public”	 dimension	 if	 they	 are	 to	 be	 fully	 satisfied,	 a
seemingly	 paradoxical	 conclusion	 anticipated	 by	 his	 exchange	with	 the	 tapster.	 For	 such	 an
exchange	 shows	 us	 the	 need	 to	 resolve	 the	 apparent	 antinomies	 between	 the	 material	 and
spiritual	 realms,	 the	 demands	 of	 family	 and	 friendship,	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 mundane	 and	 the
sacred,	and	the	claims	made	by	public	duties	and	private	interests.	And	the	suggestion	is	that
we—whether	we	 are	 a	wine-drawer,	 subject	 to	 a	 lord	 or	 to	 the	 Lord,	 or	 even	 the	King	 of
England—resolve	them	not	by	sacrificing	one	to	the	other	but	by	recognizing	the	inextricable
link	between	all	of	them.
Hal’s	“Eureka”	Moment	and	St.	Crispin’s	Day
Hal	must	treat	the	customary	order	with	dignity	not	because	long-standing	social	norms	require
that	 he	 do	 so,	 but	 because	 it	 reflects	 a	 truth	 found	 in	 that	 horizon	 which	 encompasses	 and
ennobles	his	political	pursuits.	The	dignity	of	the	customary	and	the	lawful	may	not	necessarily
lie	 in	 its	 specific	 prescriptions	 but	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	 give	 word—however	 inadequate	 the
expression—to	 that	broader	order	 that	governs	us.	This	 insight	may	us	help	us	 to	understand
Hal’s	enigmatic	remarks	at	 the	close	of	his	experiment.	Again,	 in	response	to	Poins’	“what’s
the	issue?”	Hal	says	(1H4	II.iv.89–91),
I	am	now	of	all	humors	that	have	showed	themselves	humors	since	the	old	days	of	goodman	Adam	to	the	pupil	age	of
this	present	twelve	o’clock	at	midnight.
In	 a	 statement	whose	 time-related	 references	 recall	 the	Act’s	 broader	 themes,	Hal	 seems	 to
declare	 that	 he	 now	 grasps	 all	 of	 those	 human	 passions	 that	 have	 always	 moved	 men;	 the
preceding	 exchange	with	Francis	 has	 revealed	 an	 enduring	 truth	 about	 human	nature.	Such	 a
“eureka”	moment	 naturally	 constitutes	 for	Hal	 an	 educational	 one,	 for	 he	 calls	 it	 his	 “pupil
age,”	an	education	conditioned	by	 the	“present	12	o’clock	at	midnight.”	Because	Hal,	 in	 the
very	next	line,	asks	Francis	for	the	time,	we	can	rest	assured	that	he	is	not	reading	the	clock	on
the	wall.
Midnight,	like	dusk,	evening,	dead	of	night,	and	dawn,	designates	a	natural	nocturnal	phase
and	not	simply	a	point	on	the	clock.	“12	o’clock”	however,	represents	the	conventional	effort
to	mark,	in	this	case,	the	end	of	one	day	and	the	beginning	of	another.	Such	enigmatic	phrasing
might	 suggest	 that	 Hal’s	 insight	 into	 human	 nature	 is	 best	 described	 by	 the	marriage	 of	 the
cosmic	and	conventional	orders.	Far	from	placing	upon	the	text	an	interpretive	burden	that	 it
could	not	possibly	bear,	 this	 reading	picks	up	on	 an	 image	already	mentioned	 in	 this	 scene:
Francis	tells	Hal	that	he	marks	his	age	by	Michaelmas,	the	feast	of	St.	Michael	celebrated	on
September	 29.	 With	 its	 proximity	 to	 the	 autumnal	 equinox,	 Michaelmas,	 in	 addition	 to
heralding	 the	 onset	 of	winter,	 also	 calls	 to	mind	 the	 perfect	 balance	between	night	 and	day.
Given	this	earlier	reference	to	the	equilibrium	between	two	seemingly	opposed	elements,	is	it
so	 incredible	 to	 think	 that	 Hal	 might	 have	 in	 mind	 the	 possibility	 of	 bringing	 together
antinomies	in	a	way	that	doesn’t	favor	one	over	the	other?
This	reading	becomes	even	harder	to	resist	when	we	consider	that	this	feast	day	not	only
brings	 together	 the	 divine,	 natural	 and	 customary	 orders,	 but	 does	 so	 to	 celebrate	 the	most
glorious	 of	 God’s	 angels	 near	 a	 time	 when	 the	 forces	 of	 light	 and	 darkness	 are	 evenly
balanced.	Michaelmas	may	thus	represent	in	fine	the	kind	of	glories	that	Hal	seeks	to	carve	out
for	 himself	 when	 he	 finally	 ascends	 to	 the	 throne:	 to	 have	 his	 name	 take	 on	 almost	 holy
significance	by	 linking	 it	 to	a	convention	 that	 celebrates	 the	balance	of	 those	 forces	 that	 are
independent	of	human	making	but	which	govern	men’s	affairs.	Far	from	reflecting	the	limitless
Machiavellian	pursuit	of	individual	glory,	Hal’s	education	here	suggests	the	need	to	do	justice
to	 the	 limits	 imposed	 upon	 us	 by	 a	 cosmic	 order,	 limits	whose	 boundaries	 are	 brought	 into
specific	relief	by	the	customary	order	which	regulates	human	affairs.	“Michaelmas”—like	the
references	 to	 “Charlemagne’s	 wagon”	 earlier	 or	 that	 “goodman	 Adam”	 with	 whom	 both
humanity	 and	 time	 originate—prepares	 us	 for	 Henry	 V’s	 St.	 Crispin’s	 day	 speech	 and	 his
attribution	of	the	victory	at	Agincourt	to	God.
In	the	first	place,	the	victory	at	Agincourt	becomes	that	single	event	by	which	the	men	who
fought	there	and	lived	to	“see	old	age”	would	order	their	lives.	Because	of	their	conquest	over
the	enemy’s	overwhelming	forces,	those	who	fought	with	Henry	win	for	themselves	a	sense	of
self-respect	that	allows	them	to	“stand	a	little	taller”—to	rise	above	their	low	stations	and	to
take	pride	in	their	manhood,	lessons	that	such	men	can	pass	on	to	their	sons	and	neighbors.	It
also	becomes	the	event	which	brings	political	order	to	the	life	of	the	British	people.	For	in	a
victory	won	by	the	united	efforts	of	Irish,	Welsh,	Scottish	and	English	forces,	one	discovers	a
British	 “nation	 certain	 of	 its	 ruler,	 possessing	 an	 absolute	 unity	 of	 purpose,	 animated	 by
wartime	camaraderie,	the	exhilaration	of	conquest,	the	pride	of	demonstrated	superiority,	and
given	over	to	the	feeling	that	it	lives	in	a	blessed	historical	moment.”26	The	triumph	of	Henry’s
forces	here	thus	marks	the	birth	date	of	the	modern	British	nation,	a	birth	date	whose	undying
commemoration	will	perpetuate	the	national	unity	so	daringly	won.
But	 their	 victory	 and	 the	 national	 order	 born	 from	 it	 does	 not	 just	 reflect	 the	 triumph	of
secular	 politics.	 By	 repeatedly	 invoking	 Crispin	 Crispinus	 in	 his	 speech	 (six	 times	 in	H5
IV.iii.40–67,	and	once	at	IV.vii.89),	Henry	tries	to	link	in	the	minds	of	his	audience	the	military
victory	at	Agincourt	to	the	religious	figures	with	whom	it	shares	a	date.	That	Henry	ascribes
the	victory	to	God	alone	(IV.viii.107–121),	that	he	orders	his	victorious	forces	to	sing	the	Non
nobis	and	Te	Deum,	and	that	he	charges	death	for	those	who	praise	themselves	for	the	victory
just	 won	 (IV.viii.115–117)	 suggests	 that	 the	 King	 wants	 a	 feast	 day,	 which	 is	 to	 take	 on	 a
radically	new	political	meaning,	to	retain	that	broader	religious	horizon	capable	of	ensuring	its
continued	commemoration.	Finally,	as	the	leader	of	God’s	army	in	a	miraculous	win	against	the
French,	Henry	lays	to	rest	any	doubt	about	the	legitimacy	of	his	claim	to	the	throne.	Though	the
credit	 must	 be	 given	 to	 God,	 everyone	 in	 England	 and	 France	 knows	 that	 the	 victory	 was
achieved	 by	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 King	 and	 those	 with	 him.	 The	 apparent	 discrepancy	 between
Henry’s	speech	and	the	effect	of	his	deeds,	far	from	revealing	an	inconsistency	in	his	rhetoric,
suggests	 rather	 his	 fidelity	 to	 healthy	 politics	 by	 balancing	 the	 antinomies	 such	 politics
requires.	 For	 if	 men	 simply	 wait	 for	 God’s	 divine	 intervention	 and	 don’t	 take	 up	 arms	 on
behalf	of	what	is	just,	noble	and	good,	then	they	will	always	wait	until	it’s	too	late;	and	yet	to
allow	 men	 to	 think	 of	 themselves	 as	 masters	 of	 their	 own	 fate	 is	 to	 abandon	 them	 to	 a
politically	unwholesome	sense	of	freedom.
If	 Shakespeare	 intends	 his	 audience	 to	 understand	 Henry	 V’s	 spectacular	 victory	 at
Agincourt	 to	 reflect	 the	moment	 in	which	he	 reconciled	 the	competing	demands	made	by	 the
political	and	heavenly	realms	and	reflected	in	the	tensions	between	public	duties	and	private
interests,	as	I	maintain,	then	he	could	have	hardly	picked	a	more	symbolic	day.	While	the	date
of	Agincourt	(October	25)	will	commemorate	the	birth	of	the	modern	British	nation,	the	name
of	the	feast	day	also	calls	to	mind	not	one	but	two	saints,	brothers	whose	martyrdom	for	Christ
won	them	immortality,	a	soul-salvation	that	mimics	their	shoemaking	vocation,	that	is	a	“trade”
one	 “may	use	with	 a	 safe	 conscience,”	which	 is	 to	 say	 “a	mender	of	 bad	 soles.”27	That	 the
patron	saints	of	shoe-makers	are	alleged	 to	have	been	 twins,	 two	offspring	produced	by	one
birth,28	and	that	this	Catholic	feast	day	allegedly	belonged	originally	to	a	pagan	deity,	merely
adds	weight	 to	 the	 contention	 that	 this	 customary	 celebration,	with	 its	 overlapping	 religious
dualities,	 represented	 the	 opportunity	 by	 which	 King	 Henry	 V	 could,	 through	 force	 of	 his
political	will	 alone,	bring	 together	 the	natural,	 conventional	and	divine	orders	 in	a	way	 that
would	preserve	 the	 immortal	glory	of	 the	British	people	and	 their	king.	Of	course,	 that	King
Henry	V	could	glimpse	such	harmonization	as	the	highway	to	the	glories	reserved	for	the	likes
of	Charlemagne—or	even	St.	Michael—in	his	princely	exchange	with	Francis	should	heighten
our	appreciation	for	the	essential	unity	of	the	Henriad,	of	the	career	of	Henry	V	and	of	the	best
possible	political	ruler	that	Shakespeare	could	envision.	Indeed,	capturing	this	unity	seems	to
be	 the	hallmark	of	political	 life	 at	 its	 best	 even	as	 it	 reminds	of	 the	 limitations	 that	 govern,
guide	and	restrain	the	best	political	orders	and	the	statesmen	who	found	and	lead	them.
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